Bridging the Gap for Seabed Mining: Preparatory Instruments for the New Law of the Sea Convention by Jenisch, Uwe
Bridging the Gap for Seabed Mining:
Preparatory Instruments for the
New Law of the Sea
Convention*
UWE JENISCH**
The possiblity of ratification of the Draft Treaty on the Law of the
Sea increases the need to begin discussing the organizations that
will be created under the treaty. This article discusses the need
for, and structure of, a temporary preparatory commission to be-
gin work on the International Seabed Authority once the treaty is
ratified. The author concludes that the debate over the structur-
ing of the Preparatory Commission is sure to be another obstacle
to convention ratification.
At the recent ninth session of the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, it became apparent that the Confer-
ence approaches its final political stage. The prospect of
Convention ratification increases the need to begin structuring
the international organizations that will be created under the
Convention. New international organizations such as the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority need temporary Preparatory Commis-
sions to pave the way for their early stages. Thus, the
establishment of a Preparatory Commission (Prepcom) becomes
a problem relating to the regulations governing the entry into
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force of the Convention.'
The Prepcom offers an opportunity to forge a link between na-
tional interim legislation and the Convention itself regarding sea-
bed activities prior to the entry into force of the Convention,
which cannot be expected until the second half of the 1980's. In
the absence of a well drafted "grandfather clause" written into
the Convention, potential investors will need some kind of in-
terim protection. National legislation has already been enacted
by the United States2 and the Federal Republic of Germany. 3
Similar legislation is in the parliamentary process in the United
Kingdom 4 and other industrialized nations are expected to fol-
low.5 These "legislative states" have started negotiations to har-
monize their respective national rules and regulations with the
object of making their licensing systems complementary and re-
ciprocating. This process, which is sometimes referred to as the
"mini-treaty," is necessary to maintain fair competition among
the industrialized mining States.
The developing States have consistently rejected the legality of
national interim legislation.6 A realistic way of removing these le-
gal challenges and threats of reprisal is a combination of risk in-
surance under national legislation and preparatory investment
protection under the wider framework of the Prepcom.7
The ninth session under the chairmanship of the late Mr. H.S.
Amerasinghe dealt briefly with proposals for a Preparatory Com-
mission. The major organizational aspects of the proposed Pre-
paratory Commission were outlined in a working paper dated
March 3, 1980.8 The idea of a Prepcom along lines similar to the
1945 United Nations Preparatory Commission9 met with general
approval.
1. Note by the President on the Final Clauses, FC/1 of July 23, 1979; Pro-
gramme of Work for the Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/BUR.13/Rev. 1
(1980).
2. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, ]ER 2759, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).
3. Interim Law for Seabed Mining, [1980] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 1457
(W. Ger.).
4. Deep Seabed Mining (Temporary Provisions) Bill, ILL 32, 48th Parlia-
ment, 2nd Sess. (1980).
5. E.g., Belgium, France, Japan, Italy and the Netherlands.
6. Letter from Ambassador E. Kanyanya Wapenyi, Chairman of the Group of
77, to the President of the Conference (Aug. 29, 1980) reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/106 (Sept. 23, 1980).
7. Address by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson, American Mining Congress
(Sept. 24, 1980).
8. Note by the President on the Proposed Preparatory Commission, PC/1 of
March 3, 1980; Report of the President on the Work of the Informal Plenary on the
Preparatory Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L55 (1980).
9. Instruments Establishing Preparatory Bodies of International Organiza-
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An informal proposal by Conference President Amerasinghe
envisions establishing the Prepcom by Conference Resolution as
a forerunner to the International Seabed Authority.'0 The
Prepcom could emerge as the manpower and organizational fore-
runner of the Authority. As the proposal now stands, the
Prepcom would start work as soon as fifty signatures were ap-
pended to the Convention and would carry on until the Conven-
tion entered into force.
Under the current proposal the Prepcom would consist of a rep-
resentative of each State that signs or accedes to the Convention.
The Prepcom would elect its own chairman, determine its own
rules and regulations, and would be financed by repayable United
Nations loans. The Prepcom would be entitled to establish sub-
sidiary committees and its mandate is circumscribed as follows:,
1. Convoke the Assembly of the Authority.
2. Prepare the agenda and first session of the Council.
3. Prepare draft rules of procedure and financial regulations for the As-
sembly and the Council.
4. Make studies and recommendations for the initial budget of the Au-
thority and the Enterprise.
5. Prepare recommendations for relations with other United Nations or-
ganizations.
6. Submit proposals for the Secretariat, including staff regulations.
7. Make studies and recommendations on the establishment of the seat
of the Authority and on the Law of the Sea Tribunal.
8. Deal with any other matter falling within its sphere of activities.
The most important function of the Prepcom is likely to be the
preparation of rules, regulations, and procedures in accordance
with art. 17 of annex I of the Convention. This work is neces-
sary to start the first seabed operation and must be done before
the Convention enters into force. A new art. 308, para. 4, intro-
duced as part of the Final Clauses during the ninth session, stipu-
lates that the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Prepcom
are to apply provisionally pending formal adoption by the Author-
ity through consensus." This means that if consensus is not
reached, the rules and regulations drafted by the Prepcom would
remain in force indefinitely. However, according to the footnote
tions, FC/8 of Aug. 13, 1979 with a synoptical outline of precedents for preparatory
commissions in the U.N. system.
10. Informal Proposal by the President of the Conference, PC/2 of Mar. 14,
1980.
11. Id. para. 8.
to art. 308, para. 4, this provision will be reconsidered as work pro-
gresses on the Prepcom.
Finally, the Prepcom is to deal with any other matter falling
within its sphere of activity. This includes the possibility of es-
tablishing a preparatory investment protection system (pip sys-
tem) for the interim period between signature and entry into
force of the Convention. The chances for subsequent ratification
of the Law of the Sea Convention by major industrialized States,
will depend on the extent to which preparatory investment pro-
tection and the rules, regulations, and procedures outlined above
are handled satisfactorily by the Prepcom. The United States
made detailed proposals regarding investment protection in April
of 1980 that established a link between the Prepcom and the in-
dustrialized States' interest in preliminary investment protec-
tion.12
The United States proposal relates to investments that will
have to be made to develop seabed mining technology before the
Convention enters into force. These pre-production investments
include activities such as mapping, exploration, and construction
of a small pilot plant. They do not include major production units
which can only be justified once all rules and regulations have
been passed. The cost of prospecting alone is estimated at rough-
ly ten million dollars.13 An international pip-system for site-spe-
cific investments through the Prepcom is conceivable by the
terms of the United States proposal provided these conditions are
met:
1. Priority for the pre-Convention investor if mining rights for the same
area are claimed by later applicants.
2. Similar priority for the Enterprise on a prospected area according to
the parallel system.
3. Transformation of priority claims into legal rights to mine a site once
the Convention has come into force, but subject to the fulfillment of all
other objective preconditions of the application procedure according to
annex I and on the understanding (if the proposal is interpreted cor-
rectly) that there is not a bona fide right to such transformation, but
merely evidence of priority.
The first two conditions could be entrusted to the Prepcom to
be executed by means of a simplified advance application proce-
dure. The transformation into a legal right would have to be in-
corporated in the Convention itself because the circumstances of
this transformation constitute an exception to the provisions of
art. 6 of annex III which governs the approval of plans of work.
12. Informal Working Paper by the United States; An Approach to Interim
Protection of Investment, IA/1 of April 2, 1980 and IA/1 of Aug. 11, 1980 (revised).
13. Address by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson, American Mining Congress
(Sept. 24, 1980).
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This advance site designation system would enable the Enter-
prise in the pre-Convention stage to prepare for its role in the
strict application of the parallel system. This would substantially
accelerate the date at which commercial production could begin
and would generate revenues for the Authority at an earlier
date. 14 However, it should be noted here that the United States
proposal says very little about the reserved area where the Enter-
prise is supposed to work. Currently there are no proposals for
some kind of "Interim Enterprise" or "Baby Enterprise." In order
to be acceptable to a wide majority of States, the United States
proposal should also cover the reserved area.
This system would serve as an incentive for States to sign the
Final Act or accede to the Convention without delay in order to
become a Prepcom member. In this way, the Prepcom and the
pip-system bring the Convention nearer to ratification. On the
other hand, parliaments responsible for ratifying the Convention
will be annoyed that their approval is practically circumvented by
the provisional implementation of substantial Convention provi-
sions.
During the ninth session the developing States were opposed to
the United States proposal but did not oppose the inclusion of
Prepcom and pip-system questions in the agenda for the tenth
session to be held in the spring of 1981.15 The current controversy
regarding the Prepcom and pip-system leaves little doubt that
there will be extremely difficult negotiations constituting, in ef-
fect, a "Conference within the Conference." More problems that
must be dealt with include: environmental control on the seabed,
preliminary activities in the reserved area, and the treatment of
joint ventures with the Enterprise and between developing and
industrialized States. Alongside other unresolved aspects of the
Law of the Sea Convention and growing dissatisfaction with the
overall distributive injustice, the problem of the Prepcom seems
sure to prove another stumbling block on the long road to initiate
the new Law of the Sea Convention.
14. NEPTUNE, August 1980, at 1 (Interview with U.S. experts Knecht and
Meyer).
15. Programme of Work for the Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/BUR.13/
Rev. 1 (Aug. 28, 1980).

